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27 July 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR:

25X1A

I have reviewed the JIIRG Report on a comma and period basis, as you requested, and most of my thoughts are shown in the marked up copy attached. There are also comments about the general tone and organization of the Report, which I have included in remarks here. As you are aware, I am completely opposed to some of the recommendations, and I have spelled out some details regarding this here also.

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## WORKING DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

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In paragraph A, I feel that there is a little too much of a sales job, and that the position of photography particularly its importance, may be over-stressed. If it really is important people understand it, and it isn't necessary to make too much of it in the report. I have slightly changed the emphasis to indicate that the increase in cost arises from the increased use, and the increased use is because the product is really important.

On page 5, paragraph B, I made some changes in the first assumption which I think may make it a little less subject to misinterpretation. This is reflected again in the material which I have added to the third assumption.

On page 7 I have some problems with the way that the third finding and conclusion are stated.

On page 7, paragraph 3, I wonder whether or not COMOR, for example, would concur in this. The report is primarily addressed to national requirements, and considering in particular the satellite reconnaissance effort, how much more has to be done to satisfy the requirements for "comprehensive" and "more timely"?

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On page 8, and in other areas, the frequent reference to missions and the potential of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is so optimistic as to raise questions as to whether or not it represents fact, or is a continuing promise in order to justify past decisions. With regard to the findings on page 8, for example, what is it that guarantees or even strongly indicates a significant capability in a unit which is not yet operational? Have orders been cut to transfer the cream of the crop in imagery interpreters to the [REDACTED] Does this organization have priorities for new and better equipment which is not available to other RTS's?

On page 11 I feel that item 23 might well be deleted. The other findings might not be obvious to the people to whom this report is addressed, but certainly 23 is. It just seems to be out of context at this point.

Also on page 11, item 22, whatever is supposed to be said there is sort of obscure. Are we trying to say that photo interpreters have varying degrees of capability because some guys are more trained than the other, or because they are used differently, or both? I sort of suspect that it is both, but as it is now stated it seems to hang in mid air.

Also on page 24, I don't see why paragraph 24 should be included. This can be picked up elsewhere if it is really

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needed, and this is supposed to be, as I understand it, a summary of findings and conclusions. I think the abolition or restructuring of [ ] etc. 25X1A falls more in the lines of a recommendation which is required in order to instrument and accomplish the new look in imagery interpretation. The fact that [ ] should 25X1A be dissolved, for example, does not directly come out of the findings and conclusions, I don't believe. The fact of the matter is that within the present structure everybody seems to think that [ ] is doing a pretty good job. 25X1A 24 just presupposes the acceptance of the recommended plan. This might be a little bit obnoxious to some readers.

On page 12, the DCI, of course, issues DCID's and the methodology for this need not be spelled out in this report. They are issued with concurrence of USIB, and in both recommendations 1 and 2, I think it would be sufficient to just indicate the appendix where the detailed description of the recommendation is found.

In Recommendation No. 2, the inclusion of a description of the committee is somewhat inappropriate unless all other recommendations are going to be described also.

Recommendation No. 3 is rather redundant if the functions of [ ] are, in fact, explicitly given in the DCID to the COMEX. The responsible management should

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take some initiative and not have to be directed by the DCI or the Secretary of Defense to dissolve these redundant functions.

As I am sure you are well aware, I feel that the fourth recommendation is outside the scope and ground rules for the whole JIIRG activity in that processing was not going to be considered, and therefore this should be struck in its entirety. The inclusion of this, and the stretching of the guidelines, results in the longest recommendation of the entire group and gives the appearance of a sweep-up and patch job. The JIIRG has not been tasked to provide this kind of a recommendation, and, in fact, the NRO recommendation is available to the Secretary of Defense and the DCI via USIB or as members of the EXCOM at this time if they wanted to consider it. If you wish to look at the NRO recommendation in detail, I would be happy to discourse at length as to why I think the recommendations of themselves are not very good.

Recommendation No. 5 is not very explicit, and a recommendation to adopt and refine a proposed methodology is sort of a weak wicket; it is almost like saying I am not satisfied with what we're recommending that you adopt.

I would delete Recommendation No. 7 on page 13. The new committee should, of course, be responsive to the USIB, the members of USIB, the committees of USIB, etc., and if the

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Secretary of Defense or the DCI wish to have that Committee worry about construction programs, as well as imagery interpretation, they can make an appropriate assignment to the Committee. Compared to the other recommendations, I think this is rather trivial and arbitrary. I also find this particular recommendation to be somewhat self-contradictory in that the first sentence calls for a re-evaluation of the construction plans for a building, while the second sentence says to approve and accelerate such construction as may be required.

I have difficulties also with Recommendation No. 8 in that it is redundant and unnecessary. It also presupposes the guidelines that are going to be established by a new USIB Committee. I should think that this would fall out naturally from Recommendations 1 and 2.

If the rationale behind Recommendation No. 9 was developed anywhere, I fail to see it. I agree that the collection equipment with which the RTS is presently associated does have some multisensory collection capability, but so also do some current Army aircraft. The Secretary of Defense and/or The Director of Central Intelligence don't have to gang up on this one, at least I don't think so.

As I recall, the National Tasking Plan and the words that are wrapped around the COMEX both implicitly define

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the need for very close liaison with the collection programs.

The National Tasking Plan and the COMEX implicitly require that common basis for predicting needs be established, and that this be based on the single collection estimate. I think that Item 10 is laborious and redundant.

The 11th recommendation is a real dandy. It's just got to stay in. Good thinking.

On page 22 in paragraph 12, about half way down, it isn't clear to me how the expansion of assigned intelligence production responsibilities directly leads to overlap and duplication. The question arises here as to why these responsibilities are expanded.

On page 25, paragraph 18, I find the first sentence to be a rather controversial one. First of all, it just isn't true because additional tasks, etc., could be undertaken if some of the things that are now being done were stopped. The statement could very well be interpreted by Bureau of the Budget and others as meaning that maximum efficiency was now being achieved. We don't really keep, for example, a large reserve in our military forces on active duty. If the current organizations had such a reserve capability, what would these people be doing? I am certain

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that they would find something with which to fill their days.

25X1A Again on page 25, paragraph 18, I am a little confused as to why the [ ] should continually be advertised as something great in the future. It would seem a sort of a capability that might be developed in any one of the existing organizations, or parceled out among the existing organizations, and unless these alternatives are considered and rejected I don't see why the JIIRG should engage in crystal ball gazing on this point.

On page 26, paragraph A-Background. Here and elsewhere throughout the report I think that an essential ingredient is overlooked. The magnitude of the future imagery exploitation effort is directly related to the amount of tasks which are required by the organizations that produce finished intelligence, and it turns out, of course, that more types of imagery interpretation are becoming available, so there are a number of factors that are involved. But if the customer doesn't step up to the door there aren't going to be any sales made. The magnitude of the reconnaissance effort, for example, might simply be to put film in the bank. Just because you have it doesn't mean that you have to look at every bit of it, or, in fact, any of it. I think here, and in a number of places, the report might be strengthened by surmizing

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that the analyst and the people that produce intelligence will want this kind of support, and that these are factors




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isn't done, and I suspect that a good bit of the reason why it isn't done is because the analyst doesn't appreciate it and therefore doesn't ask for it. Until that changes, the workload should not increase.

On page 29, paragraph 8, I have a little problem with that prediction. First of all, the effort that has been conducted so far has provided a lot of base photography, etc.; also, as we are well aware, many things were done on a repetitive basis because the management of the photography in that area was not particularly good. With the establishment of the large Army facility there, and better management organization of that area in general, I would anticipate a considerable improvement in the efficiency with which film was both gathered and used even though operations may continue for quite some time. The prediction of a continuation of chaos should be looked at rather sharply, I would think.

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Furthermore, it might be interesting to determine the impact on imagery interpretation needs if that whole area suddenly became all sweetness and roses. Now presumably a reserve capability would suddenly be in hand, but what would be effect of this alternative?

On page 30, paragraph 9; in paragraph 3 we have already said that we act as though we have an authoritative source for coming up with characteristics of the various systems, and it seems rather useless to me to then indicate that we got these from the NRO. I think it would be much better to simply say that the NRO gave a lot of briefings in the very first sentence of paragraph 3, and then go ahead with all the projections. I think we have chewed this excessively here. Paragraph 10 also doesn't really say anything new; it's like being against mother, and I think rather trivial. The same thing goes for paragraph 11 on page 31.

On page 31, paragraph 12, the last part of that sentence is the thing that I mentioned earlier. The anticipated workload depends upon the tasking which the intelligence analyst generates. I think that could be stated a little more clearly in not quite so sophisticated a fashion as it is given here; like "the anticipated expression for need for extraction of such information." I think that's called "imagery interpretation tasking," isn't it?

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